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The relationship between the European Union (EU) and Asia is in flux. The 
EU intensified its economic ties to Asia and boosted its security cooperation 
in the region in 2011 and 2012. But new challenges, including the crises in 
Ukraine and the Middle East, have made it difficult to sustain this incipient 
momentum. There are a number of steps that EU and Asian governments can 
and should take to continue to strengthen their relations.
A New Focus
• The eurozone crisis encouraged the EU to upgrade its trade and commer-
cial relations with Asia, as European governments sought out economic 
growth that was lacking at home. 
• European and Asian governments have made many formal commitments 
to strengthen their economic and political ties. With EU agreements pro-
ceeding slowly, member states have often pursued their own bilateral pacts 
in the region.
• The EU has begun to position itself as a partner in nontraditional security 
approaches in Asia, launching strategic dialogues and calling for the rule 
of law to be applied in maritime disputes. While this attention to soft 
security is much needed, the model is meeting severe resistance from some 
Asian countries.
• The long-overlooked relationship between the EU and the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) received a particularly important 
boost as European governments deepened their ties to the region. But to 
progress further, it must overcome growing tensions within some ASEAN 
member states.
• As the economic crisis subsided, so too did some of the impulse behind the 
EU’s turn toward Asia. Meanwhile, concrete follow-through on existing 
commitments has been lacking.
How the EU and Asia Can Maintain the Momentum
Expand trade rules. In trade policy, the EU and Asia should build on the 
plethora of bilateral free trade agreements either signed or being negotiated to 
develop more multilateral commercial rules.
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Stress unity, not bilateralism. The EU will not have a single foreign policy in 
Asia that completely cuts out member states’ policies. But European govern-
ments should temper the trend toward competitive bilateralism and focus their 
efforts on more coherent aims.
Promote soft security. Although the EU will not be a major security player in 
Asia, it can and should do more to promote nontraditional forms of coopera-
tive security.
Focus on human rights and democracy. As social protests gather steam in 
Asia, the EU will need to reconsider the place of human rights and democracy 
in its Asian policy, correcting its neglect of the issue in recent years.
3Introduction
In 2011 and 2012, in the deepest trough of economic crisis, the European 
Union (EU) moved to intensify its engagement with Asia, giving these long 
underprioritized relations a much-needed jolt. But, three years on, new chal-
lenges have arisen to sustaining this dynamism. 
Prior to the eurozone crisis, the EU’s main focus in the region had under-
standably been on its economic relationship with China, and the union had 
failed to accord Asia’s other rising powers the importance they merit. But as the 
euro teetered on the edge of collapse, the EU broadened its Asia policy. Both 
European and Asian governments recognized the need to strengthen economic 
and financial cooperation. Growing strategic tensions in Asia also brought the 
need for more meaningful security cooperation center stage. The EU made a 
series of commitments to upgrade its strategic and economic presence in Asia. 
During 2011 and 2012, the EU made its own modest pivot toward Asia. 
European commercial diplomacy intensified across the region, from Japan and 
Indonesia all the way to India. A plethora of trade talks advanced. The EU drew 
new, apparently ambitious, strategic guidelines for the region and declared 
2012 its Year of Asia. Its then foreign policy high representative, Catherine 
Ashton, stated: “Developing our relations with Asia across the board is a major 
strategic objective.”1 The number of European ministerial visits to Asia mush-
roomed. Member state governments frequently alluded to their commitment 
to intensifying political, economic, and social links with 
Asia. Asian governments reciprocated the apparent desire 
to move relations into a new phase. Governments on both 
sides invested notably more effort into ASEM, the biennial 
Asia-Europe Meeting summit.2 
There are now incipient signs that this new momen-
tum in EU-Asia relations has slowed. The October 2014 
ASEM summit in Milan included many useful bilateral sessions (and a meet-
ing between EU leaders and presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and Petro 
Poroshenko of Ukraine that rather stole the show) but did not produce any 
significant results.3 The new Europe-Asia rapprochement has not unraveled but 
it has decelerated.
This shift can be explained by several changes to the economic and political 
landscapes on both the Asian and European sides. These include the way that 
the eurozone crisis has evolved; the emergence of new conflicts in the EU’s 
immediate neighborhood; and more challenging security and political con-
ditions in Asia. The often underanalyzed relationship between the European 
The new Europe-Asia rapprochement has 
not unraveled but it has decelerated.
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Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also been 
an important factor in recent years. And, in considering European policies 
toward Asia, it is important to look not just at the role of the EU collectively, 
but also at member states’ national strategies—and the crucial, complex rela-
tionship between the two.
There are, however, a number of ways in which the gains registered in recent 
years can be consolidated and a serious loss in momentum averted. One issue 
is of crucial conceptual importance to both economic and 
strategic questions: a sustained and mutually beneficial 
EU-Asia relationship will in the future depend not only 
on ad hoc achievements in particular policy areas, but also 
on institutionalized rules and norms to guide the relation-
ship—and on how solidly these can be embedded in prac-
tical decisionmaking.
It has become a somewhat hollow and tired cliché to 
note that Asia and Europe matter to each other; endlessly 
repeating this does not reveal much that is useful. The 
question is whether there is political will on the two sides to move the rela-
tionship into a qualitatively superior phase, with more firmly rooted practices 
based on reciprocated and diffuse mutual benefit. If there is not, for all the 
gains made in the last five years, policy toward Asia will remain the poor rela-
tion of EU foreign policy, and Asian policies toward the EU will lack firm 
geostrategic commitment. 
New Challenges and New Approaches
If the EU did not turn inward and become dramatically more protectionist 
during the eurozone crisis, this was in large measure because European gov-
ernments saw fast-growing Asian markets as a potential source of growth—
growth that has been so pitifully limited within Europe itself. However, while 
European economies still need this growth, since early 2014 the policy priori-
ties appear to have changed. 
While the EU has not definitively resolved the root causes of its economic 
problems, the situation appears less acute today than in 2011–2013. European 
governments still avidly hunt for trade deals and support their companies as 
they compete for international contracts. But the desperate need to attract Asian 
funds to cover debts has abated somewhat. Moreover, concern has shifted from 
the economic crisis to a series of political-strategic crises in Ukraine and the 
Middle East that are pulling the EU’s attention away from Asia.
Of course, historically, European powers were deeply and controversially 
engaged in Asia. But as EU foreign policy cooperation deepened, the region 
slipped down Europe’s list of strategic priorities. In 2011 and 2012, the EU 
made substantive efforts to reengage.
A sustained and mutually beneficial EU-Asia 
relationship will in the future depend not 
only on ad hoc achievements in particular 
policy areas, but also on institutionalized 
rules and norms to guide the relationship.
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The euro crisis quickly intensified the EU’s commercial and economic focus 
on Asia. In 2012, the EU and Asia became each other’s biggest trading part-
ners. European governments’ assertive economic diplomacy helped ensure that 
EU exports to Asia increased during the crisis.4 
The EU concluded its most far-reaching trade deal with South Korea in 
2011. This strongly benefited EU exports to the country, which increased 
by more than 30 percent in 2012. The EU also accounted for 40 percent of 
foreign direct investment in South Korea in 2012. A free trade accord with 
Singapore was finalized in December 2012. Negotiations for similar agree-
ments were opened at various stages with Japan, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Taiwan. European Union officials insisted that the raft of 
new bilateral offers would eventually feed into a process of overarching multi-
lateral liberalization.
Europe’s commercial dealings with China also intensified. EU exports 
to China increased exponentially during the eurozone crisis, narrowing the 
union’s trade deficit with the rising giant. Furthermore, Chinese investment in 
EU economies increased more than tenfold, from 700 million euros ($875 mil-
lion) in 2008 to 7.4 billion euros ($9.3 billion) in 2011. A third of all Chinese 
foreign investment in 2011–2012 went to EU states.5 Talks began on an 
EU-China investment treaty. Much of this new trade and investment involved 
Germany, which accounts for nearly a half of all EU trade with China.
The EU has been the main advocate for this trade liberalization, in part 
because Asian states currently enjoy lower barriers into European markets 
than vice versa. Since the crisis, trade with Asia has become more important 
for the EU; for Asian economies it is intra-Asian trade that has become more 
important. At the same time, European governments competed among them-
selves for Chinese funds in large measure because the money came without the 
kind of International Monetary Fund conditionality that 
the EU for a long time preached to developing states—an 
irony highly relevant to the reshaping of global governance 
that is not lost on Asian powers.6 
Yet the eurozone crisis was also of major concern to 
Asian economies. The situation revealed just how deeply 
interdependent the European and Asian economies have 
become. Mainly as a result of the euro crisis, between 2010 
and 2012 total net private capital flows to emerging Asia virtually halved.7 Asia 
was the region that was most highly leveraged to European bank credits. It 
was the region that suffered the largest output losses attributable to the crisis.8 
Most Asian politicians and business leaders remain keen on having the euro 
as a counterbalance reserve currency to the dollar and followed the currency’s 
plight with growing concern.9 Asian states also sought bilateral deals with the 
EU as a counterweight to their increasing trade dependence on China.
The eurozone crisis revealed just how 
deeply interdependent the European 
and Asian economies have become. 
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During the crisis, Asia became the largest holder of euro-denominated 
assets. From 2010 to 2012, Japan bought 7 billion euros ($8.7 billion) worth 
of bonds issued by the eurozone’s temporary rescue fund, or 7 percent of the 
rescue bonds on issue; in 2013 it moved to purchase bonds from the European 
Stability Mechanism—the temporary fund’s permanent successor—as it 
issued securities for the first time.10 By 2013, Asia’s major central banks had, 
on average, more than a quarter of their foreign exchange portfolios in euro-
denominated assets.11
With Europe so clearly weakened, the crisis was also seen as a chance for 
China to prove itself as a responsible stakeholder in global affairs, ready to take 
into account systemic dangers, and not merely its own immediate gain.12 Chen 
Zhimin, director of the international politics department at the School of 
International Relations and Public Affairs in Shanghai, insists that the gravity 
of the crisis was sufficient to make China less conflictive and more cooperative, 
mindful of the impact on its own interests. While figures are contested, one 
economist estimates that China went from holding 26 percent of its reserves 
in euros in 2010 to 30 percent in 2013.13 China did not release official figures 
but was thought to have bought around 1 trillion in euro-denominated assets.14 
There are signs that the injection of momentum into economic relations 
between 2011 and 2013 may be flagging. Although trade links continue to 
deepen, new policy developments are not quite so evident, as the euro crisis has 
moved (hopefully) beyond its most acute stage and growth in Asia itself has 
slowed somewhat.
While overall trade between Europe and Asia has increased, its rate of 
growth in 2014 slowed from 2013. Most of the trade talks that were launched 
during the crisis have failed to make any decisive breakthroughs. Both the 
European and Asian sides have declined to invest sufficient political will or to 
make the concessions necessary to closing these agreements within a reason-
able time period. As of late 2014, the EU’s talks with India, Japan, Taiwan, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia were all languishing in a 
state of relative atrophy (although there are hopes that those with Vietnam 
and Japan may have the potential to advance soon). Policymakers acknowl-
edge that the prospect of a trade agreement with Indonesia in particular is 
still a relatively distant one. New trade commitments made at the November 
2014 APEC forum throw the lack of movement in many EU negotiations into 
sharper relief. 
If the eurozone crisis encouraged at least a modicum of flexibility between 
the EU and China, a harder edge has returned to commercial relations. In 
2013, the European Commission, the EU’s executive body, threatened legal 
action against China for alleged trade distortions in the solar panels and tele-
communications sectors, using this as leverage to seek negotiated accords with 
Beijing. In October 2014, this appeared to pay off when the EU reached a deal 
with China on telecommunications, based on the latter reducing export credits 
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to its companies and the union dropping its proceedings at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
As one means of facilitating deeper economic integration, there remains 
much talk of upgrading region-to-region measures through ASEM. The stan-
dard refrain speaks of ASEM unlocking qualitatively new, networked forms of 
economic cooperation, beyond the traditional trade and investment agenda. 
China and Singapore raised the possibility of an ASEM free trade agreement, 
but there was little enthusiasm for discussing it seriously among other mem-
bers. Some Asian states have been keen on creating a permanent ASEM secre-
tariat, but most EU member states do not see value in that proposal. 
There have been some advances. Mobility is increasing under the EU’s new 
Erasmus+ education and training program, which will provide opportunities 
for some 4 million Europeans to study and volunteer abroad. The EU is also 
discussing visa facilitation. And business and civil society forums are now held 
alongside the formal ASEM summit.
However, one expert makes a sober assessment. Yeo Lay Hwee, director of 
the EU Center in Singapore, points out that with 51 members—nearly double 
its original 26 states—the unwieldy ASEM body needs a 
far deeper revamp if it is to survive in a crowded market-
place of international forums. At present it neither has logic 
as a high-politics forum of strategic relevance nor is geared 
toward concrete results in select areas of policy substance.15 
Related to this, the most dynamic areas of Europe-Asia 
relations have recently come through extended bilateral 
efforts on both sides, rather than on a region-to-region 
basis. Asian economies compete among themselves for the 
most favorable bilateral accords with the European Union. The far-reaching 
free trade agreement with South Korea has engendered pressure from other 
Asian countries for similar conditions in their negotiations with the union.
With EU-level agreements proceeding so slowly, European governments 
have increasingly prioritized their national-level commercial diplomacy strate-
gies with individual Asian markets. Nearly all European states now have their 
own bilateral partnerships with China, for instance; Germany’s is particularly 
far-reaching.
Consequently, Europe-Asia relations are today a diffuse patchwork of 
national, subregional, and regional initiatives that sometimes reinforce but 
often cut across each other. This goes beyond the obvious and unremarkable 
fact that EU member states tend to break ranks in pursuit of national gain—
they do so everywhere in the world. The multilevel complexity of relations 
between Europe and Asia is of a different order to the situation that exists in 
other regions.
More broadly, given the Ukrainian and Islamic State crises, Asian diplo-
mats fear that the EU’s attention is being pulled away from Asia. Asian issues 
The most dynamic areas of Europe-Asia 
relations have recently come through 
extended bilateral efforts on both sides, 
rather than on a region-to-region basis.
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are once again not so clearly present at summits or council meetings. Critics 
lament that the EU has been drawn back into a fixation with its own neighbor-
hood policy framework, focusing on states that are likely to be less strategically 
important than Asia in the long run. 
An October 2014 report on the EU’s foreign policy argues that the union 
still suffers from an “ostrich-like view of the political tensions in East and 
South-East Asia,” its head in the sand as it denies the extent to which insta-
bility in this region could devastate European economies far more than con-
flicts in the Middle East and Ukraine.16 Overall EU policy still requires wider 
constituencies within a larger number of member states who see the strategic 
importance of Southeast Asia and South China Sea issues, which hold the key 
to several aspects of international security, commercial relations, and global 
problem solving. And, conversely, Asian states need to look beyond their own 
immediate region to see the value of working with Europe on the big global 
challenges that affect them as much as the EU. 
A Sharpened Security Environment
Since the EU began in 2011–2012 to tentatively feel its way toward a limited 
engagement with security issues in Asia, the region has become notably tenser. 
Many observers have commented on the paradox of Asia’s economic integra-
tion coexisting with its rising political nationalism and zero-sum geopoliti-
cal rivalries. In this environment, the EU’s commitment to foster rules-based, 
cooperative approaches to security in the region struggles to gain traction. Soft 
security is an increasingly hard sell, as the risk of outright conflict has increased 
in parts of Asia.
But the EU has begun to take Asian security seriously and to explore a mod-
est number of areas where it might make a useful contribution. One adviser to 
the EU’s foreign policy arm, the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
sees the prospects in extremely upbeat terms, with the EU having the ability 
to shape the region’s security framework, in particular through an EU-U.S.-
China strategic dialogue.17 
In 2012 the EU upgraded its East Asia policy guidelines to emphasize geo-
political and security questions.18 The same year, Ashton for the first time 
attended the ASEAN Regional Forum, the group’s main security dialogue. 
In mid-2012, Ashton and then U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton signed 
a joint statement promising transatlantic dialogue on Asian security and com-
mitting to cooperation on maritime security in particular. In June 2013, 
Ashton for the first time attended the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual Asia-
Pacific security forum, and said the EU was committed to being a security 
partner for the region, with a “unique comprehensive approach” and an inter-
est “not in projecting power but in empowering.”19 
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The EU has moved further to upgrade existing, low-profile programs on 
border management, maritime patrols, and training in preventive diplomacy 
with Japan and ASEAN.20 Several Asian and European countries are work-
ing together in the EU-led Atalanta counterpiracy operation in the western 
Indian Ocean. A first-ever EU-ASEAN high-level dialogue on maritime secu-
rity was organized in Jakarta in November 2013. New dialogues have also 
begun across the region on climate security, disaster management, trafficking, 
and cybersecurity. Diplomats report that the role of the EEAS in Asia policy 
has strengthened relative to that of the commission’s Directorate General for 
Trade, providing a more geopolitical tone. The European Commission has 
promised to mold its aid profile in Asia more tightly to the EU’s strategic turn 
to the region, such as by funding more interregional dialogues.21 Member 
states have also signed a plethora of bilateral strategic partnerships with Asian 
powers, committing to a more political level of cooperation.
For its part, the EU-China strategic dialogue has become a layered set of 
consultations among diplomats, security personnel, country special represen-
tatives, regional ambassadors, and conflict management units. The two sides 
have made efforts to explore the possibility of coordinating positions on North 
Korea, Africa, piracy, and other issues. The chairman of the EU Military 
Committee travelled to Beijing in October 2014 to hold the first of a more for-
malized EU-China Dialogue on Security and Defense—part of the EU-China 
2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation agreed to in 2013.
South Korea in particular seeks a broader partnership with the EU, as it feels 
squeezed between China, Japan, and the United States. Diplomats in Seoul 
stress the importance of new and more practical cooperation on human rights, 
climate change, development policy, the Middle East, and crisis management. 
South Korea has come to see European engagement with Pyongyang as offer-
ing a useful conduit; as the administration of South Korean President Park 
Geun-hye has tilted more toward engagement with North Korea, diplomats in 
Seoul report that their cooperation with the EU on this issue has been revived.
In formal EU proposals, the notion of a Europe-Asia global partnership 
has also gained much currency. Immediately prior to the Milan ASEM sum-
mit, one of the EEAS’s most senior diplomats stressed that the EU “needs 
strong commitment from influential Asian partners to tackle global challenges 
such as climate change and environmental sustainability, the fight against pov-
erty, terrorism, nonproliferation, illegal migration and human trafficking.”22 It 
remains unclear, however, what tangible results can be expected to flow from 
all these new dialogues and initiatives. European diplomats acknowledge that 
the EU’s core post-2012 leitmotif in Asia of “beyond trade, beyond China” has 
so far materialized only in limited form. 
The EU’s new high representative, Federica Mogherini, recognized the chal-
lenge at her October 2014 inaugural hearing in the European Parliament: she 
noted that while Europe is now convinced of Asia’s strategic importance, Asian 
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countries are not fully convinced that Europe matters to them strategically—
a reversal of the imbalance that existed for many years. The huge number of 
European ministerial visits to Asia now contrasts with the relatively limited 
number of senior Asian ministers coming the other way into Brussels and other 
European capitals—another inversion of the previous norm.23 
More than two years on from the Ashton-Clinton statement, substantive 
results of cooperation between the EU and the United States in Asia are not 
evident—only a series of meetings between the larger member states and U.S. 
officials. Indeed, U.S. interest in cooperation with the EU in Asia appears to 
have diminished. And there has still been no high-level strategic discussion to 
define a clear European line on the rebalancing to Asia announced by the U.S. 
administration in 2012.
Soft Security and Its Limits
The only de facto choice available collectively to the EU is to focus on soft secu-
rity in Asia. European diplomats are clear that the EU cannot be a hard power 
in the region and that it can only add a nontraditional security perspective. But 
even this approach carries with it problems and limitations, including what 
Asian diplomats say is the EU’s frequent unwillingness to be tough on China. 
A soft security role would mark a distinctive contribution in a region already 
replete with hard realpolitik, and it offers something different from the U.S. pres-
ence and security guarantees in the region. If the U.S. pivot is widely perceived 
to be aimed at containing China, the EU argues that Asian security depends on 
all-inclusive mechanisms of integration and cooperative rule making. European 
Union officials distinguish the European and U.S. approaches to Asian security 
thus: “The U.S. will be an Asian power. We will be an Asian partner.”24 
However, while nontraditional security is now formally on the agenda for 
many Asian powers, in practice it is the subject of much resistance. There are 
relatively basic differences over what the concept means. Many Asian diplo-
mats are sympathetic but consider the EU understanding of the term to be too 
soft and see nontraditional threats of marginal importance compared to the 
overriding China-U.S. competition for strategic dominance. They see security 
primarily as a matter of geopolitical balancing rather than relying on nontradi-
tional approaches—although how far all Asian states actually follow this logic 
through (especially with China) is not always clear. 
Parenthetically it might be noted that the EU’s own record on soft secu-
rity is far from stellar at present, in light of increasingly exclusionary migra-
tion policies, a relative lack of action on the geostrategic dimensions of climate 
change, and now popular anger over inchoate reactions to the Ebola pandemic. 
European development aid budgets have been dramatically cut back; the EU 
(the commission plus member states) remains Asia’s largest aid donor but its 
claim to be advancing a development-oriented concept of security is not as 
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strong as it used to be. With thousands of migrants dying in the Mediterranean 
and xenophobic parties on the rise across Europe, one wonders what lessons the 
EU currently has to impart on progressive, far-sighted approaches to migra-
tion. The restriction of civil rights in recent counterterrorist provisions in some 
member states also raises questions about the EU’s claim to have a nontradi-
tional model of counterterrorism to share with Asia.
Meanwhile, China has effectively prevented outside involvement aimed at 
cooperative security in the region. Beijing sees its strategic dialogue with the 
EU as a vehicle for influencing European positions on issues such as Syria 
or Iran, not for encouraging the union’s involvement in Asian security. Even 
the new EU-China High-Level People-to-People Dialogue—the softest of soft 
approaches—has progressed slowly, addressing very uncontroversial topics and 
not remaining entirely free of the involvement of authorities.25 
Singapore and to a lesser extent other states are wary of allowing the EU 
into the East Asia Summit, the annual meeting of regional leaders that in 
recent years has also included the United States and Russia. Singapore fears 
that the EU’s weight would tilt the balance against ASEAN leadership of the 
forum and that the union may side with the United States too confrontation-
ally against China. The EU justifiably feels its contribution and footprint in the 
region are far greater than Russia’s. (Nordic member states, somewhat incon-
gruously, have now allowed Singapore into the Arctic Council.) 
Such imbalances bring forth suggestions from some European diplomats 
based in the region that the EU needs to learn how to do tit-for-tat bargaining 
in Asia rather than offer benefits devoid of political quid pro quos. The EU has 
for some time confronted unwillingness in Asia to contemplate nonrealist con-
cepts of security.26 Notwithstanding a number of modest crisis management 
and mediation initiatives in Southeast Asia, perceptions remain in the region 
that the EU is chiefly a developmental humanitarian and not a security actor.27
The EU has begun to engage in maritime surveillance and to be more out-
spoken on the need for legal rules in this area to be respected (that is, by China). 
But while the EU says it wants maritime disputes to be resolved through the 
rule of law, it has little in the way of concrete instruments to back up this call. 
The union has been cooperating with ASEAN to help develop a code of con-
duct, as a means to constrict Chinese behavior. However, caution still prevails. 
The EU says it is impartial and fair in all maritime disputes in the region. But 
most states see it as far too soft on China. It talks about the primacy of rules, 
but when China threatens existing rules, it keeps silent in order—Asians feel—
not to put trade at risk. 
Notably, when tensions snowballed between China and Japan in 2013 over 
the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, the EU remained 
unengaged. Insiders reveal that one of the main reasons for EU passivity was 
pressure from China not to get involved. Representatives of other Asian states 
in private express disappointment with the union’s apparent willingness to 
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sit on the sidelines. They complain that the EU has not maximized what it 
could be contributing in rules-based mediation to complement the U.S. role.28 
With several arbitration cases on territorial claims due in 2015, the EU still 
needs to decide whether it will unequivocally support rulings against China.29 
European policymakers argue that these Asian criticisms are somewhat incon-
sistent, as the EU has been willing to take a tougher line on China’s actions 
than most Asian states.
The EU and Japan signed a strategic dialogue on security in 2005, which 
led to some joint border monitoring and counterpiracy operations. But that 
has self-evidently not prevented the emergence of a more abrasive Japanese 
foreign policy that many in the region fear risks stirring instability and tension. 
The EU has walked an increasingly thin line, concerned at Japanese policy 
trends but still seeing Japan as a balancing bulwark against Chinese claims and 
actions. Conflagrations over the islands reveal the need for cooperative secu-
rity rules but also the narrowing space for traditional EU approaches based on 
impartial rules and equidistant positioning between adversaries. 
It remains unclear what the EU would do in the event of more serious ten-
sions in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan officials in Taipei feel that the EU is stalling 
on finalizing a new economic and cooperation agreement because of pressure 
from China. They stress that the current government’s relatively cooperative 
relationship with mainland China has led the EU to underestimate the risk 
of tensions returning and to insufficiently heed Taiwan’s call for international 
political support. 
It is also not clear that Asian countries are fully signed on to the EU’s notion 
of global partnership. Indeed, for Asian countries, a balanced form of global 
partnership needs to comprise not simply their support for EU concerns but 
European willingness to recognize Asia’s increased global weight. Asian pow-
ers pressed for a change in voting weights in international 
bodies as a quid pro quo to their support in the euro cri-
sis. They still charge European powers with holding on to 
their own overrepresentation in global bodies to the detri-
ment of Asia’s broader geopolitical role. 
In one example of limited convergence, while summits 
and official meetings without fail refer to the shared chal-
lenge of climate change, European and Asian policies on 
the issue remain divergent in key aspects. Climate is said to be an exemplar of 
nontraditional threats, and yet the EU-ASEAN dialogue on climate change 
does not appear to be moving into a phase of producing any tangible results. 
Furthermore, most Asian states were ambivalent in confronting Russia on 
its annexation of Crimea in March 2014. They have seen the Ukraine conflict 
more as a Europe-Russia dispute than as a case of one state menacing the core 
rules of an international order that affects Asia, too. Singapore was critical 
and Japan has imposed sanctions on Russia, but most Asian powers remain 
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circumspect. Many in the region harbor some sympathy with Russia’s chal-
lenge to what they consider to be Western-made rules, even if in private Asian 
diplomats admit to a profound unease over the Crimea episode. 
The Ukraine crisis also poses a problem for ASEM, which has counted 
Russia as a member since 2010. The group cannot realistically lay claim to 
any kind of shared values or meaningful strategic partnership—at least while 
Russia continues to foment deadly violence in eastern Ukraine and overtly 
challenge the norms of the EU’s Eastern Partnership. Asian powers are unlikely 
to join with EU states to use the ASEM umbrella to pressure Russia on its dis-
regard for global norms. 
There is another factor that makes talk of soft and rules-based security an 
uneasy fit in Asia: the huge increases in European arms sales to the region—
including to the formally embargoed Chinese market. Many member states 
explicitly prioritize Asian markets for increased arms sales. Britain and France 
also offer accompanying training to the Chinese military. This relates to the 
broader point that critics charge European governments with adhering in prac-
tice to a very statist notion of security, despite their frequent discussion of 
nontraditional, soft, and human security.
It is also striking that the EU’s narrative on Asian security is all about inter-
state tensions; this contrasts with its focus in other regions on security threats 
emanating from instability within states. Such internal instability is commonly 
the result of bad governance. Notwithstanding useful ini-
tiatives in Myanmar and the Indonesian province of Aceh, 
Asia is the region where EU human rights and democracy 
support is most circumscribed. In short, the EU makes 
little link between security and democracy in Asia.
Much is said and written about the EU’s diminished 
attention to human rights in China. But the pattern is 
wider. The EU has gradually accepted the Asian preference for noninterference 
more than Asian states have converged on the European support for demo-
cratic values. 
The EU has opened trade talks with Vietnam without any focus on dem-
ocratic reforms. Vietnam has benefited from sizable gains in EU aid and 
has become the largest recipient of European development assistance in the 
region—without any political reform. Indeed, as its regulatory governance has 
strengthened, so the EU has channeled the largest share of its aid directly into 
the Vietnamese government’s state budget. This increased support has been 
spurred by the country’s economic performance, which allows it to compete 
against China in low-cost production.30 
ASEM oversees a long-running human rights dialogue that takes places out-
side its formal framework, due to Asian sensitivities. This has gathered some 
momentum, although it sticks to discussing generic issues and cannot tackle 
The EU makes little link between 
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specific human rights concerns in any particular country. The EU’s human rights 
dialogues in the region are rather formalistic and devoid of tangible results. 
The ASEAN Opportunity
It has become something of a ritually noted observation in Europe-Asia forums 
and debates that relations with ASEAN offer one of the most promising areas 
for improvement and strategic gain. And indeed, if the EU is to fulfill its stated 
aim of broadening its Asia policy beyond China, its relationship with ASEAN 
will be critical.31
This generally understated part of EU-Asia relations received a notable 
upgrade in 2012. Yet, once again, the degree to which the EU will in fact 
follow through remains unclear. A common ASEAN view is that the EU has 
become overly anxious about China’s rise and consequently still neglects to 
engage systematically with the rise of other Asian powers.32
ASEAN is due to complete an economic community in 2015, potentially 
unlocking one of the most important opportunities for EU cooperation in 
Asia. But political problems in Myanmar, Thailand, and 
even Indonesia are also raising new challenges for the rela-
tionship with ASEAN.
In April 2012, the EU and ASEAN agreed to an action 
plan to deepen cooperation. Catherine Ashton led the 
largest-ever delegation of EU officials to an EU-ASEAN 
ministerial dialogue, which promised deeper institutional 
ties on everything from counterterrorism to trade. The EU 
acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which opens the 
possibility of being included in the East Asia Summit. A July 2014 EU-ASEAN 
meeting in Brussels made a series of further commitments. The EU will now 
appoint an ambassador to ASEAN and grant the association the status of stra-
tegic partner.
The EU released a new tranche of money to support ASEAN regional inte-
gration in 2012. The EU has recently funded new initiatives on standards 
harmonization, technical trade advice, and capacity building for the ASEAN 
secretariat. The EU will double its institution-building support to ASEAN, to 
170 million euros ($213 million) for 2014–2020. In this period, commission 
aid to Southeast Asia will be close to 3 billion euros ($3.8 billion), compared to 
2.2 billion euros ($2.8 billion) for the previous budget period. 
However, the recent record is mixed. Officials lament that the 2012 
EU-ASEAN action plan contained a raft of detailed commitments whose fol-
low-through is proving slow. One reason is the need for ASEAN to develop 
smoother internal decisionmaking processes. 
The EU is the biggest investor in the ASEAN countries but amounts are 
still relatively limited in proportionate terms. The region receives only around 
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2 percent of EU outward investment. The EU still does more trade with 
Switzerland than with the countries of ASEAN, which represent a market of 
over 620 million people. While the commission’s aid increases are welcome, 
per capita amounts are extremely limited compared to its aid flows to mid-
dle-income Mediterranean and Eastern European states. Moreover, the rise in 
commission aid contrasts with a decrease in most member states’ aid alloca-
tions to Asia. 
The EU is waiting to see if the ASEAN Economic Community is indeed 
formed at the end of 2015. This potential game changer would bring with it the 
prospect of an EU-ASEAN free trade agreement (talks for which were aborted 
in 2009) and more political links. But diplomats in the region caution that the 
proposed single market is likely to be implemented only very gradually and in 
a soft sense, so it may not be quite the fillip that some predict. Moreover, it will 
continue to be intergovernmental and thus rely on mutual recognition of rules 
and standards rather than on EU-style supranationalism. 
Recent trends are also raising more difficult challenges for bilateral relations 
with several ASEAN member nations; these risk complicating the EU-ASEAN 
regional relationship.
In Myanmar, ahead of presidential elections in 2015, the regime-led reform 
process appears to have stalled on several key issues, such as ethnic minority 
rights and far-reaching constitutional reform. At present, diplomats judge that 
the army is unlikely to allow opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi to run in 
the elections.
The EU has made a meaningful contribution to Myanmar’s political 
opening, incrementally removing sanctions and providing funds to support 
the country’s human rights commission; administrative, judicial, and police 
reforms; training on citizenship rights; and the new Myanmar Peace Center, 
to encourage dialogue among ethnic groups.33 The EU has also created a task 
force to coordinate and mobilize further resources.
The director of the peace center welcomes the fact that the EU is now the 
initiative’s most generous supporter. But, in conversation, he calls for a major 
strengthening of EU and other external support to help preserve the precarious 
reform process, get all ethnic groups signed up to a lasting ceasefire, and develop 
sustainable mediation mechanisms. The EU has been slow in beefing up its del-
egation in Myanmar. Broader cooperation in the country should be possible, for 
instance with Singapore, which is now providing legal training programs. 
Thailand’s military coup in May 2014 led the EU to freeze trade talks 
with the country. The EU is pressing the ruling National Council for Peace 
and Order to comply with its three-stage roadmap for a return to democracy. 
The possibly imminent succession may unleash instability, and it is not clear 
how the EU and other ASEAN states will react if the military shows signs of 
clinging to power. Even if a constitutional process is reinstated, events in 2014 
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reveal that Thailand needs serious and deep institutional reform if it is to avoid 
periodic relapse into political instability and military takeover.
In Cambodia, there was an extended period of tension as the opposition 
contested Prime Minister Hun Sen’s 2013 election victory. While this was 
resolved, the country’s lack of democratic reform is the subject of increasingly 
fractious internal debate. Hun Sen has been an authoritarian ally to China in 
pushing back efforts to strengthen maritime security norms. The EU declined 
to remove trade preferences in response to these recent troubles, but it is begin-
ning to slow down its engagement with Cambodia.
So far, the EU-ASEAN partnership on democracy and fundamental rights 
remains thin on substance. The EU has made a 3 million euro ($3.8 million) 
loan facility available to help the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights. But beyond this invaluable contribution, European human 
rights and democracy funding within Southeast Asian states is more limited 
than in many other regions. The EU-ASEAN conclusions from July 2014 talk 
of good governance but not democracy.
As ASEAN moves toward economic union, it may look to deeper coopera-
tion and knowledge-sharing with the European Union. However, while the 
EU can offer useful lessons in regional integration, the economic crisis has fur-
ther reinforced ASEAN governments’ skepticism over Europe’s highly institu-
tionalized model of cooperation. It is for strategic support, rather, that ASEAN 
looks to European powers. Its diplomats argue that China, India, and Japan 
are big enough to look out for themselves, whereas smaller and medium-sized 
states have greater need of deep international alliances. 
Maintaining the Momentum
The EU moved up a gear in its relations with Asian countries due to the eco-
nomic crisis; now many European governments are again slipping back into 
according them only secondary importance. Of course, the official rhetoric on 
both sides is that relations remain a priority and that there is no loss of momen-
tum. But there is a subtle change in texture and a certain loss of urgency. Fraser 
Cameron, director of the EU-Asia Center in Brussels, puts it thus: while the 
EU has deepened its commitments to a range of new dialogues on a whole 
array of subjects and at multiple bilateral, subregional, and regional levels in 
Asia, it is holding back from taking the next step to ensure that these produce 
real impact.34 
Some experts argue that the EU is right to focus on its own neighborhood 
and not overreach by seeking to be any kind of foreign policy player in Asia. 
They assert that it is only in its immediate neighborhood that the EU has fun-
damental interests at stake and that its liberal-cooperative approach to security 
has any relevance.35
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And it might be reasonable to conclude that EU-Asia relations are largely a 
nonstory. The EU has now reacted to Asia’s rise and raised its policy commit-
ments to the appropriate level. Relations are deepening gradually, if unspectac-
ularly; there are no dramatic, first-order tragedies to confront as with Ukraine 
or the Middle East. It is well known that form trumps substance in Europe-
Asia relations; yet insofar as form and tone matter in constructing trust with 
Asian governments, this might not be such a grave deficiency. By definition, 
not every region can be a priority for EU foreign policy; and perhaps Asia just 
does not need to be. 
Such a call for temperate measures carries much wisdom. The EU should 
resolutely avoid overselling its potential in a region that understandably remains 
sensitive about the effects of European power. Its aims and pretensions should 
be grounded and modest. Lessons should be learned from the EU’s harmful 
impact on other regions where it has promised more than it can deliver. And it is 
understandable that after its apparent rediscovery of Asia in 2011–2013, the EU’s 
attention in 2014 focused on the crises in Ukraine and Iraq-Syria, the change 
of leadership in the union’s own institutions, and a second phase of governance 
reforms relating to the long and difficult recovery from the euro crisis.
Notwithstanding all this, however, the EU would be seriously remiss in 
letting the incipient momentum in EU-Asia relations subside. The European 
Union took a long time to get serious about Asia’s rise and start putting in 
place policy commitments that accord the region its due weight. While there 
are indeed significant challenges to keeping that momentum going, it would 
constitute seriously bad strategic judgment if the EU were now to relapse into 
leaving these new initiatives to languish on relatively ineffectual autopilot. 
Instead, the EU should make improvements to its current policies. These are 
not specific policy recommendations, but rather relate to the general structural 
factors that are likely to condition Europe-Asia relations in the long term. The 
next phase of the relationship must center on the stability and robustness of 
institutional rules and process, at various levels: 
Trade 
Beyond the need to conclude outstanding trade agreements, more rules-based 
liberalization will be required as part of the next stage in Europe-Asia rela-
tions. The EU and Asia should coordinate their efforts to harmonize the large 
number of bilateral trade deals that are now operating or under negotiation. 
A move back to EU-ASEAN trade talks (if and when the economic commu-
nity moves forward) could be a catalyst for this—both in terms of tying together 
the union’s various bilateral efforts in Southeast Asia and in promoting ASEAN as 
a platform for harmonizing rules across Asia. Asian governments express concern 
that there has been such a profusion of trade deals—purely internal to the region 
and involving various combinations of external actors, too—that coordination 
is needed to make sure this does not become a source of interstate wrangling. 
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Probably the most significant contribution the EU could make to Asian security 
dynamics would be to help promote regional economic integration in a way that 
dampens political tensions—rather than to offer economic relations of a nature 
that intensifies political rivalries. For Asian states, diversification of trade away 
from China remains a long-term strategic priority.
While Chinese trade practices are generally considered to be the most impor-
tant of all issues for the EU in Asia, in this and other cases the long-term chal-
lenge is not simply market access but the development of legitimate rules. The 
EU needs to get back to addressing trade issues with China through WTO dis-
pute mechanisms and reverse the recent trend toward politically negotiated tit-
for-tat bargaining.36 Talks on an investment treaty offer the prospect of reducing 
some of China’s myriad obstacles to access that face European companies.
In return, China insists that a reversal of new market restrictions in several 
EU member states is a prerequisite to engaging in serious talks; European gov-
ernments will need to clarify their own rules on economic security, which are 
increasingly used to define some strategic sectors as off-limits to Chinese and 
other investors.37 More credible rules might allow the EU-China High Level 
Economic and Trade Dialogue to resume and facilitate more productive dis-
cussion on a wider range of challenges, such as revisions to both the Chinese 
and European growth models.
Unity, Not Bilateralism
At present Europe-Asia relations unfold in ways that favor bilateralism and 
sharpen competition between powers within each region. Recent notable 
developments have not been those at a region-to-region level. In some sense 
this is a source of dynamism. However, this pattern risks 
self-interested geostrategy and mercantilism becoming too 
dominant relative to rules-based trade liberalization and 
security, which would benefit both regions on a more pre-
dictable and sustainable basis. 
For example, member states’ competitive rush for 
Chinese investment through bilateral incentives cuts across 
their own strictures on the need for transparency in sov-
ereign wealth funds.38 While a degree of national competition is natural and 
unavoidable, the EU needs to set limits. The union has sought to do something 
along these lines in the energy sphere, where the commission now reviews 
bilateral deals for their consistency with overarching EU strategic goals. 
This is not to make a utopian call for the end of bilateralism. There is no 
prospect of that happening. Rather, the structure of future Europe-Asia rela-
tions must be made multilevel in a more coherent and rationalized fashion. 
They require a balance of flexibility and regional cogency. In certain policy 
areas, practically oriented “minilateral” clusters, involving the smallest number 
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of countries necessary, are likely to be appropriate. Many in the EU have talked 
of minilateralism as an essential component of future European foreign policy. 
Policies toward Asia are an area where this would be especially pertinent—par-
ticularly regarding the issue of security, a realm where such balance can be put 
to the test. 
Security
A modest European soft security role in Asia is achievable and desirable. The 
EU should pay greater heed to Asian states that want European help to boost 
international rules as a means of influencing Chinese behavior; yet it should 
also avoid collusive bandwagoning against China. The challenge is to achieve 
such a finely balanced position. 
Upgrading ASEAN to a strategic partner was the subject of much pressure 
and much diplomatic maneuvering—and policymakers in both Europe and 
Asia accord the move great significance. But this entirely positive step forward 
should not mask the fact that all of the EU’s strategic partnerships remain 
somewhat void of substance. Simply giving ASEAN such a formal status does 
not in itself achieve anything tangible. Likewise, participating in a dialogue 
on maritime security is a welcome advance but hardly constitutes a security 
strategy. The EU is beginning to consider more operational 
assistance to ASEAN, for surveillance and port security, 
but this needs to be accelerated and significantly enhanced. 
The EU and Asia should prioritize concrete issues of coop-
eration at this kind of subregional level, to embed minilat-
eral practices that can then be extended to a regional level.
Longtime ASEM participants insist that today there 
is more commingling between different combinations of 
Asian and European states and less of an “us-and-them” feel 
to meetings. But this trend needs to extend much further. Both sides have talked 
about their global partnership on politico-security issues, yet in practice the 
EU-Asia relationship is still not a joint or balanced one. While the EU pressed 
its way into the ASEAN Regional Forum, and now chairs a session there, one 
wonders whether the union would invite ASEAN to participate in or chair its 
discussions on the eurozone crisis, Ukraine, or the Southern Mediterranean. 
With current international crises menacing the very concept of a global rule 
of law, this should be a time for clearer, two-way cooperation. Singapore cer-
tainly should be a partner in strengthening international law, as it depends 
so much on legal rules. But Asian diplomats commonly berate the EU for 
not abiding fully by the principles of the liberal order it encourages others to 
follow—while European governments complain that Asian countries are still 
unwilling to step up and help resolve global problems. Both sides will need 
flexibility and a greater willingness to recognize the limitations of their respec-
tive stances toward global governance. 
The EU and Asia should prioritize concrete 
issues of cooperation at the subregional 
level, to embed minilateral practices that 
can then be extended to a regional level.
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Ensuring consistency between the economic and security spheres remains 
a key challenge, both for EU policy and for Europe-Asia cooperation. Since 
2012, the EU has ostensibly been committed to ensuring that the commercial 
and geostrategic parts of its policies in Asia are better connected. There is so 
far little evidence that they are. For example, while China prioritizes bilateral 
links with Germany for highly geopolitical reasons, Germany lacks a strategic 
approach to China that is informed by its export drive in the country.39 As 
the new EU high representative now has more power to coordinate foreign 
and trade policy making in Brussels, a clear mapping and systematic analysis 
should be prepared of how the economic and security dimensions undercut or 
reinforce each other. 
Human Rights and Democracy
For some time, the issues of human rights and democracy have not been prom-
inent in Europe-Asia relations. The EU’s own commitment to these values 
within its foreign policies has been far more selective than many Asians per-
ceive to be the case; and today the EU suffers many human rights deficiencies 
within its own borders. Asian governments have been powerful and buoyant 
enough to push back against what Europeans refer to as their values agenda. 
However, current trends in both regions suggest that rights issues cannot be 
ignored over the longer term—however strong the case for realpolitik. Pressures 
for more accountable governance are accumulating in many Asian states. The 
protests in Hong Kong, the emergence of a democracy protest movement in 
Taiwan, and events in Thailand all show that Asia is not immune from the kind 
of civic empowerment witnessed in other regions. Both Asian and European 
governments are struggling to keep pace with the eruption of new social move-
ments and what they mean for political representation and legitimacy. For 
many years analysts bemoaned the fact that the EU was seriously behind the 
times, still lecturing Asian governments on human rights. 
But the argument that political issues should be down-
graded now looks rather out of date itself—not because of 
what is happening at the international governmental level 
but because of social trends within Asia. 
If and when Asian governments step forward to assume 
greater global responsibility, commensurate with their 
economic success, they may see that what happens within 
states cannot be divorced from what happens between 
them. This is the ground upon which a more meaningful joint narrative of soft, 
nontraditional, or human security can be developed. The EU needs to begin 
looking more seriously at intrastate drivers of instability and not only think of 
Asian security as a matter of interstate challenges.
One notable change that could be instructive is Indonesia’s emergence as 
a prominent actor in international democracy and human rights support. 
The EU needs to begin looking more 
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European governments are beginning to realize the scope for joint initiatives. 
The Dutch and Norwegian governments, together with the EU delegation, are 
the main funders of Indonesia’s influential Institute for Peace and Democracy, 
the body under whose rubric the Bali Democracy Forum is run. The institute 
focuses mainly on training in human rights, election monitoring, and peace 
mediation, but it is also beginning to move into more sensitive areas of democ-
racy support. Indonesia is pushing for the ASEAN human rights commission 
to go beyond awareness raising to undertake peer-review assessments of rights 
issues. These steps are still limited and incipient, but they should be given far 
greater encouragement and support—not least as an antidote to the idea that 
Asians do not care about democracy, while Europeans have the unique claim 
to good human rights performance.
Conclusion
The common thread of these proposals is the need to entrench more institution-
alized patterns of rules and norms in EU-Asia relations. While progress has been 
made, policy output is still subject to the vagaries of shifting political outlooks in 
both regions. Policies are still too oriented toward short-term gain rather than to 
the structural conditions of long-term success. The overarching need is to embed 
approaches that give greater solidity to the way the EU-Asia partnership can 
help advance economic, political, and international rules and norms—that is, 
the kinds of structures necessary to sustaining the two regions’ stability, security, 
and growth. It is at this as yet untackled level that the strongest case can be made 
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